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INTRODUCTION 
In their opening briefs, both Plaintiffs Marilyn Touchard ("Ms. Touchard"), Thomas 
Ammons, Felix Barela, Oscar Garcia, Dennis Nelson, Wade Peterson, Frank Ross and Heidi 
Scott (collectively "Plaintiffs") and Defendant La-Z-Boy, Inc. ("La-Z-Boy") spent 
considerable space outlining the position of other states on the certified questions. Plaintiffs' 
intent was simply to demonstrate that the vast majority of states have determined, either by 
way of legislation or judicial decision, that preventing the erosion of rights arising under 
workers' compensation statutes, by providing terminated employees a cause of action for 
wrongful termination reflects an important public policy. Plaintiffs also cited cases from 
other jurisdictions to demonstrate that this Court would be joining the vast majority of states 
if it recognizes the claims raised by the Plaintiffs. 
Of course, the issue presented in this case is whether Utah's Workers' Compensation 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, et. seq., ("UWCA"), embodies a clear and substantial 
public policy of the state of Utah. As outlined below, this Court's analysis of what 
constitutes a clear and substantial public policy demonstrates that the UWCA is a clear and 
substantial Utah policy. Based upon this Court's prior decisions, terminating, either actually 
or constructively, harassing or otherwise taking adverse employment actions against an 
employee who exercises, or assists others in exercising, rights under the UWCA violates 
Utah's public policy and provides the affected employee with a cause of action. 
Accordingly, the Court should answer "yes" to both of the certified questions and their sub-
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parts by recognizing the clear and substantial nature of the public policy contained in the 
UWCA. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LEGISLATURE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE A CAUSE OF 
ACTION IS NOT FATAL TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS. 
La-Z-Boy asserts that because the Utah Legislature has not provided a statutory right 
to recover damages based upon Plaintiffs' allegations in support of their claims that the Court 
should answer "no" to the certified questions. See La-Z-Boy's Opening Brief, pages 21-27. 
This position flies in the face of the Court's numerous decisions discussing the public policy 
exception to at-will employment. Rejecting Plaintiffs' claims because the Utah Legislature 
has not created a statutory cause of action would effectively overturn every case which has 
recognized the public policy exception to at-will employment. While the Court has 
consistently regarded legislative enactments as one source of Utah's public policy, it has 
never indicated that those enactments are the sole source of Utah's public policy. In fact, the 
Court has squarely rejected this position: 
Limiting the scope of public policy to legislative enactments would necessarily 
eliminate aspects of the public interest which deserve protection but have 
limited access to the political process. Judicial decisions can also enunciate 
substantial principles of public policy in areas which the legislature has not 
treated. Therefore, although it is not by any means a foregone conclusion that 
the public interest will be implicated in cases of employee termination, public 
policy on this question generally may be derived from both legislative and 
judicial pronouncements. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989). 
2 
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Further, the Court has recognized that the very nature of the claim does not require 
a legislative pronouncement. The Court's entire analysis of the public policy exception is 
based upon the absence of a statute providing a specific remedy. Indeed, if only the 
Legislature could create a cause of action, the whole concept of a wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy would cease to exist and there would not have been any reason for 
the Court to repeatedly analyze the exception.1 
La-Z-Boy's position that the Legislature's failure to provide a statutory right to 
recover precludes this Court from answering "yes" to each part of the certified question 
would require the Court to overturn the Court's historical reasoning outlined first in Berube, 
and reaffirmed in, Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483 (Utah 1989), 
Hodges v. Gibson Products, Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), Winter v. Northwest Pipeline 
Corp., 820 P.2d 916 (Utah 1991), Peterson, Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 
1992), Retherford v. AT&T, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1991), Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 
931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997), Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998), 
Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 987 P.2d 48 (Utah 1999), Burton v. Exam Center Industrial & 
General Medical Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000), Hansen v. America Online, Inc., 
96 P.3d 950 (Utah 2004) and Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004). Each of these 
further, the Court's decisions make clear that it has merely been recognizing an existing 
right, not creating a new right. In Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 
1992), the Court noted that "the duty at issue in actions for wrongful termination in 
violations of public policy does not arise out of the employment contract. It is imposed 
b y l a w . . . . " M a t 1285. 
3 
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cases recognized that employees terminated in violation of a public policy can state a claim 
for wrongful discharge in the absence of a statutory provision. If the Court were to adopt, 
for the first time, La-Z-Boy's position that only the Legislature can, or should, provide a 
cause of action, the Court would have to disavow its reasoning of the last seventeen years. 
However, the Court has made clear that it will: 
not overturn precedent "unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally 
erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent." 
Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007,1021 (Utah 2002). La-Z-Boy has not even attempted 
to demonstrate that the Court's rule was "originally erroneous" or that "changing conditions" 
warrant a new rule. Indeed, that is because the Court's jurisprudence is well-reasoned. 
There is no reason to allow employers to terminate employees in violation of Utah's clear and 
substantial public policies. 
II. THE COURT'S DECISIONS ON THE EXCEPTION DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE UWCA IS A "CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL POLICY" OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
As outlined in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, this Court has repeatedly recognized that 
certain terminations violate Utah's public policy allowing an employee to recover tort 
damages for the termination. While the contour and reach of an employee's right to recover 
for such terminations requires a case by case analysis, a review of the Court's decisions 
reveals that the cause of action is limited to those situations where the alleged public policy 
violation implicates a significant number of Utah's citizens. The Court's development of the 
4 
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"clear and substantial" standard to determine the breadth and clarity of Utah's public policy 
in the context of at-will employment ensures that the exception only applies in those limited 
instances which impact a large portion of the population as opposed to one individual's 
rights. Each time the Court has rejected the application of the public policy exception, it did 
so because the claim involved only that individual, or a small number of individuals and not 
society as a whole. 
The Court first recognized the potential for such a claim in Berube, 111 P.2d at 1042. 
There, the Court recognized, "[w]here an employee is discharged for a reason or in a manner 
that contravenes sound principles of established and substantial public policy, the employee 
may typically bring a tort cause of action against his employer." Despite the fact that the 
Court determined there was no reason to apply the exception to the claims presented in 
Berube, the Court recognized the importance of the exception, but stressed: 
that actions for wrongful termination based on this exception must involve 
substantial and important public policies. To this end, we will construe public 
policies narrowly and will generally utilize those based on prior legislative 
pronouncements or judicial decisions, applying only those principles which are 
so substantial and fundamental that there can be virtually not question as to 
their importance for promotion of the public good. 
Id. at 1043, emphasis in original. 
5 
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In Hodges, 811 P.2d 151,2 the Court outlined the contours of a public policy claim. 
The Court noted that, "the term 'public policy5 is a vague and elastic term in need of 
limitation so as not to provide an arguable basis for a lawsuit every time an indefinite-term 
employee is discharged." Id. at 165. The Court stated that Utah's public policy can be found 
in "legislative enactments" and "judicial decisions." Id. at 166. The Court held that, "[t]he 
declared policy of this state is that it is imperative to keep the criminal law inviolate and that 
it may not be used for achieving purposes other than bringing an offender to justice." Id. at 
167. Terminating an employee for refusing to engage in a criminal act, or using a criminal 
statute for improper purposes, harms more than the individual employee by impacting society 
as a whole.3 
The Court discussed the exception more fully in Peterson, 832 P.2d 1280. In 
Peterson, the Court held that the allegation that Browning terminated Mr. Peterson "because 
he would not falsify tax and customs documents" was "actionable under the public policy 
limitation." Id. at 1283. The Court also noted three types of terminations which "typically" 
2The Court mentioned the doctrine in two cases prior to Hodges. However, in neither 
case did the Court expand Berube. See Laron v. Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah 
1989) (applying Idaho law); Caldwell, 111 P.2d at 485, n. 2. 
3The Court reaffirmed the existence of a public policy claim in Winter, 820 P.2d 916. Mr. 
Winter claimed that his internal complaints about unsafe conditions led to his termination 
and that termination violated public policy. Id. at 917. However, given Mr. Winter's 
failure to adequately raise the issue, the Court did not address his claim. However, the 
Court did note that, "[t]he area of the law he invokes is clearly in a state of development, 
and at this time, there are no established fundamental rules of law in this jurisdiction that 
support his claims." Id. at 918, n. 2. 
6 
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lead to claims that an employee's termination violates public policy. Those three instances 
involve situations where an employee is terminated for: "(1) refusing to commit an illegal 
or wrongful act, (2) performing a public obligation, or (3) exercising a legal right or 
privilege." Id. at 1281. The Court made clear that, "the term 'public policy' is open-ended 
and varies from court to court and from case to case." Id. at 1282, citation omitted. 
However, the Court did hold: 
that the public policy exception applies in this state when the statutory 
language expressing the public conscience is clear and when the affected 
interests of society are substantial. The identification of clear and substantial 
public policies will require case-by-case development. 
Id. The Court reiterated its prior holding that, "[t]o provide a basis for an action under the 
public policy exception, a violation of state or federal law must contravene the clear and 
substantial public policy of the state of Utah." Id. at 1283. 
Shortly after Peterson, the Court decided the case of Heslop, 839 P.2d 828. In 
Heslop, the Court again recognized the limited nature of a public policy claim, but 
recognized that the Utah Financial Institutions Act, Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-318, contained a 
substantial public policy. The Court explained that the Act "serves a substantial public 
policy because it protects the public as well as regulates institutions themselves. The Act, 
therefore, does not merely regulate the relationship between private individuals such as 
employer and employee." Id. at 837. 
In Retherford, 844 P.2d 949, the Court again made the distinction between conduct 
affecting only the parties and conduct which potentially affects the public as a whole. 
7 
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Although the Court found that Ms. Retherford did not state a claim for discharge in violation 
of public policy because the statute she cited preempted her claim, the Court provided 
guidance on the types of public policy which would support such a claim: 
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently "clear and substantial" 
to support a cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy, one 
must examine the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it affects 
the public as a whole. . . . As the majority of this court recognized in 
Peterson, all statements made in a statute are not expressions of public policy. 
Many statutes merely regulate conduct between private individuals or "impose 
requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy 
concerns. " The following questions are relevant to determining whether a 
statute embodies a clear and substantial public policy. First, one must ask 
whether the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public, 
as opposed to the parties only. Second, one must inquire whether the public 
interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that we should place 
the policy beyond the reach of contract, thereby constituting a bar to discharge 
that parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal bargaining 
power. 
Id. at 966, n.9, emphasis added, citations omitted.4 
The Court again applied the "private" conduct as opposed to "public" interest 
standard in Fox, 931 P.2d 857. In Fox, the plaintiff claimed she was terminated after she 
reported that fellow employees were engaged in "churning-making existing customer 
accounts appear new on the corporate records so that they could meet sales quotas and earn 
higher commissions." Id. at 858. The Court rejected her claim and held that "the termination 
of a private sector employee in retaliation for the good faith reporting to company 
4The Utah Legislature has already mandated that an employee and employer cannot 
contract away the rights and obligations contained in the UWCA. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-108. " 
8 
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management of alleged violations by co-workers does not implicate a clear and substantial 
public policy of the state of Utah." Id. at 859. The Court reaffirmed that the alleged public 
policy must affect a large segment of the public: 
Nothing in this case affects the public interest in any significant way. The 
conduct of plaintiff s co-workers may have resulted in increased costs of the 
corporation's products and services and thereby adversely affected the 
corporate shareholders to some minor degree, but that does not violate a clear 
and substantial public policy. Nor would the effect of the increased costs on 
the corporation's prices result in a violation of a clear and substantial public 
policy. There are, no doubt, many instances of avoidable inefficiencies that 
produce higher costs and affect an employer's profits, but, for the most part, 
those are matters that involve private policy that is more or less regulated by 
forces in the marketplace, not matters that rise to a level that implicates a clear 
and substantial public interest. 
Id. at 861.5 
A year after the Court's decision in Fox, the Court decided Ryan, 972 P.2d 395. In 
Ryan, the Court provided the following guidance on the exception: 
Courts may determine whether the policy at issue is "substantial" by 
"examining the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it affects 
the public as a whole" and by determining whether we would allow an 
employer and an employee to nullify the policy by express agreement. 
Id. quoting Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966, n.9. The Court further stated: 
In our previous cases we have already outlined certain conduct that typically 
brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an 
illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws; (ii) 
performing a public obligation, such as accepting jury duty; (iii) exercising a 
5Of course, in the post-Enron world, the application of the exception to the facts presented 
in Fox might lead to a different result. 
9 
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legal right or privilege, such as filing a workers' compensation claim; or (iv) 
reporting to a public authority criminal activity of the employer. 
Citations omitted, emphasis added. By listing "filing a workers' compensation claim," the 
Court provided the prototypical example of the legal right which represents a clear and 
substantial public policy by affecting the public as a whole. 
Further emphasizing the requirement that the public policy implicated must be of a 
broad nature, the Court determined in Dixon, 987 P.2d 48, that an individual's claim for 
severance pay pursuant to a written employment agreement does not implicate a clear and 
substantial public policy. The Court held that summary judgment in the defendant's favor 
was proper. Id. at 55.6 
In 2004, while recognizing the continued vitality of the public policy exception, the 
Court reiterated the limited nature of the exception. In Hansen, the Court concluded that 
"public policy does not implicate an employer's right to restrict firearms in a parking lot 
leased by the employer and to terminate an at-will employee for violating that prohibition." 
6The Court has refused to expand statutory prohibitions on age and sex discrimination 
based upon the public policy exception where the Legislature has already provided 
employees with a means of recovery. In Burton, 994 P.2d 1261, the Court found that the 
Legislature's decision to limit recovery for discrimination to those employees who are 
employed by employers having fifteen or more employees precluded a finding that Utah's 
public policy provided a cause of action for employees whose employer employs fewer 
than fifteen employees. Id. at 1265. Similarly, in Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 61 P.3d 
989 (Utah 2002), the Court found that the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act preempted a 
claim that there was a public policy against sex discrimination when the Legislature had 
already provided a remedy. Id. at 997, None of these cases called into question the 
Court's prior analysis of how to determine if a public policy is sufficiently clear and 
substantial to provide the basis for a wrongful termination claim. 
10 
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Id. at 955. Hansen again emphasized that any claim for wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy must implicate more than private rights.7 Similarly, in its most recent case 
addressing the public policy exception, Buckner, 99 P.3d 842, the Court rejected a claim that 
a pay inequity amongst Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs caused by factoring prior law 
enforcement outside of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office violated public policy: "[t]he 
deputies' claim of pay inequity does not implicate either fundamental rights or a protected 
class." Id. at 856. 
This is not a case seeking to recover damages which impact one individual and one 
company. The UWCA impacts every Utah worker and every Utah employer. It provides the 
sole remedy for an employee injured on the job and eliminates all common law tort claims 
against employers. As such, the UWC A is a "clear and substantial" public policy because 
it impacts a large portion of the population. Irrefutably, the UWC A is "one of overarching 
importance to the public, as opposed to the parties only." Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966, n.9. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a statutory scheme which impacts a broader segment of 
Utah's workers and employers. The UWC A is the prototypical "clear and substantial" public 
policy necessary to support a claim for wrongful termination. Presumably, this is why the 
7In Hansen, the employees' termination did not significantly impact their right to have 
firearms. At most, it only affected their right to display firearms at work. This is in direct 
contrast to this case, where La-Z-Boy's actions directly, significantly and adversely 
impacted Plaintiffs' right to benefits under the UWC A when they were injured. 
11 
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Court has repeatedly used the UWCA as an example of a type of clear and substantial public 
policy which supports a claim for wrongful termination. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD ANSWER "YES" TO EACH PART OF THE 
SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION. 
As outlined in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, an employer who terminates an employee for 
assisting fellow employees exercise rights under the UWCA, or who constructively 
discharges or harasses it employees who exercise rights under the UWCA, also violates a 
clear and substantial public policy. 
First, terminating an employee for assisting fellow employees to exercise rights under 
the UWCA as Ms. Touchard did, does not merely implicate a "private" right. Ms. 
Touchard's conduct is exactly the type of activity Utah's public policy encourages. If La-Z-
Boy can terminate Ms. Touchard, or others who assist in the exercise of legal rights, with 
impunity, an employer can thoroughly chill an employee's right to benefits under the UWCA. 
As noted by the Court in Peterson, employers should "refrain from using their unique 
economic position to coerce employee conduct that contravenes clear and substantial 
policies." Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1285. A self-insured employer, like La-Z-Boy, would best 
serve its economic interest by ensuring that its employees never learn about their rights under 
the UWCA. Such action, while serving the employer's own economic interests, would 
clearly interfere with the balance between an employer's rights and responsibilities under the 
UWCA. 
12 
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Second, a constructive discharge is the legal equivalent of a discharge. The very 
concept of constructive discharge is based upon the idea that an employer has made the terms 
and conditions of employer so intolerable that any reasonable person would quit. Sheikh v. 
Department of Public Safety, 904 P.2d 1103, 1107 (Utah App. 1995); Pennsylvania State 
Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129,139 (2004). This Court has distinguished between an actual 
and a constructive discharge in analyzing a wrongful termination claim. In fact, if there were 
such a distinction, it seems the Court would have noted the distinction in Peterson where the 
claim was "constructive termination in violation of Utah public policy." Peterson, 832 P.2d 
at 1280 emphasis added. 
Finally, because a constructive discharge is legally equivalent to an actual discharge, 
an employer should not be allowed to escape liability for harassing employees (but who for 
one reason or another do not quit) who exercise rights under the UWCA. To prove a 
constructive discharge, an employee must demonstrate a series of harassing acts sufficient 
to change the terms and conditions of employment so dramatically that the only option is to 
quit. Allowing an employer to stop short of that standard and avoid liability would frustrate 
the balance of employee rights and responsibilities outlined in the UWCA by allowing an 
employer to chill the exercise of an employee's rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should hold that Utah's public policy prohibits an employer from 
interfering with an employee's exercise of rights guaranteed by the UWCA by either 
13 
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constructively or actually terminating that employee, that the same public policy prohibits an 
employer from harassing an employee who assists employees to exercise rights under the 
UWCA and also prohibits the harassment of an employee for seeking benefits under the 
UWCA. 
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